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ABSTRACT
Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CRF) is a fundamental and effective technique for solving
Imperfect Information Games (IIG). However, the original CRF algorithm only works for discrete
state and action spaces, and the resulting strategy is maintained as a tabular representation. Such
tabular representation limits the method from being directly applied to large games and continuing
to improve from a poor strategy profile. In this paper, we propose a double neural representation for
the imperfect information games, where one neural network represents the cumulative regret, and the
other represents the average strategy. Furthermore, we adopt the counterfactual regret minimization
algorithm to optimize this double neural representation. To make neural learning efficient, we
also developed several novel techniques including a robust sampling method, mini-batch Monte
Carlo Counterfactual Regret Minimization (MCCFR) and Monte Carlo Counterfactual Regret
Minimization Plus (MCCFR+) which may be of independent interests. Experimentally, we
demonstrate that the proposed double neural algorithm converges significantly better than the
reinforcement learning counterpart.
1 Introduction
In Imperfect Information Games (IIG), a player only has partial access to the knowledge of her opponents before
making a decision. This is similar to real-world scenarios, such as trading, traffic routing, and public auction. Thus
designing methods for solving IIG is of great economic and societal benefits. Due to the hidden information, a player
has to reason under the uncertainty about her opponents’ information, and she also needs to act so as to take advantage
of her opponents’ uncertainty about her own information.
Nash equilibrium is a typical solution concept for a two-player extensive-form game. Many algorithms have been
designed over years to approximately find Nash equilibrium for large games. One of the most effective approaches is
CFR (Zinkevich et al., 2007). In this algorithm, the authors proposed to minimize overall counterfactual regret and
prove that the average of the strategies in all iterations would converge to a Nash equilibrium. However, the original
CFR only works for discrete state and action spaces, and the resulting strategy is maintained as a tabular representation.
Such tabular representation limits the method from being directly applied to large games and continuing to improve if
starting from a poor strategy profile.
To alleviate CFR’s large memory requirement in large games such as heads-up no-limit Texas Hold’em, Moravcik et al.
(2017) proposed a seminal approach called DeepStack which uses fully connected neural networks to represent players
counterfactual values and obtain a strategy online as requested. However, the strategy is still represented as a tabular
form and the quality of this solution depends a lot on the initial quality of the counterfactual network. Furthermore, the
counterfactual network is estimated separately, and it is not easy to continue improving both counterfactual network
and the tabular strategy profile in an end-to-end optimization framework.
Heinrich et al. (2015); Heinrich & Silver (2016) proposed end-to-end fictitious self-play approaches (XFP and NFSP
respectively) to learn the approximate Nash equilibrium with deep reinforcement learning. In a fictitious play model,
strategies are represented as neural networks and the strategies are updated by selecting the best responses to their
opponents’ average strategies. This approach is advantageous in the sense that the approach does not rely on
abstracting the game, and in theory, the strategy should continually improve as the algorithm iterates more steps.
However, these methods do not explicitly take into account the hidden information in a game, because they are
optimized based on the transition memory and the reward of the intermediate node is the utility of the game rather
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than the counterfactual value which consider the distribution of hidden variables (opponent’s private information).
In experiments for games such as Leduc Hold’em, these methods converge slower than tabular based counterfactual
regret minimization algorithms. Waugh et al. (2015) used handcraft features of the information sets to estimates the
counterfactual regret. However, it need traverse the full game tree which is infeasible in large games.
Thus it remains an open question whether the purely neural-based end-to-end approach can achieve comparable
performance to tabular based CFR approach. In the paper, we partially resolve this open question by designing
a double neural counterfactual regret minimization algorithm which can match the performance of tabular based
counterfactual regret minimization algorithm. We employed two neural networks, one for the cumulative regret,
and the other for the average strategy. We show that careful algorithm design allows these two networks to track the
cumulative regret and average strategy respectively, resulting in a converging neural strategy. Furthermore, in order
to improve the convergence of the neural algorithm, we also developed a new sampling technique which has lower
variance than the outcome sampling, while being more memory efficient than the external sampling. In experiments
with One-card poker and a large Leduc Hold’em containing more than 107 nodes, we showed that the proposed double
neural algorithm has a strong generalization and compression ability even though only a small proportion of nodes
are visited in each iteration. In addition, this method can converge to comparable results produced by its tabular
counterpart while performing much better than deep reinforcement learning method. The current results open up the
possibility for a purely neural approach to directly solve large IIG.
2 Background
In this section, we will introduce some background on IIG and existing approaches to solve them.
2.1 Representation of Extensive-Form Game
We define the components of an extensive-form game following Osborne & Ariel (1994) (page 200 ∼ 201). A finite
setN = {0, 1, ..., n−1} of players. Define hvi as the hidden variable of player i in IIG, e.g., in poker game hvi refers
to the private cards of player i. H refers to a finite set of histories. Each member h = (hvi )i=0,1,...,n−1(al)l=0,...,L−1 =
hv0h
v
1...h
v
n−1a0a1...aL−1 of H denotes a possible history (or state), which consists of each player’s hidden variable
and L actions taken by players including chance. For player i, h also can be denoted as hvi h
v
−ia0a1...aL−1, where h
v
−i
refers to the opponent’s hidden variables. The empty sequence ∅ is a member of H . hj v h denotes hj is a prefix
of h, where hj = (hvi )i=0,1,...,n−1(al)l=1,...,L′−1 and 0 < L
′ < L. Z ⊆ H denotes the terminal histories and any
member z ∈ Z is not a prefix of any other sequences. A(h) = {a : ha ∈ H} is the set of available actions after
non-terminal history h ∈ H \ Z. A player function P assigns a member of N ∪ {c} to each non-terminal history,
where c denotes the chance player id, which usually is -1. P (h) is the player who takes an action after history h. Ii
of a history {h ∈ H : P (h) = i} is an information partition of player i. A set Ii ∈ Ii is an information set of
player i and Ii(h) refers to information set Ii at state h. Generally, Ii could only remember the information observed
by player i including player i′s hidden variable and public actions. Therefore Ii indicates a sequence in IIG, i.e.,
hvi a0a2...aL−1. For Ii ∈ Ii we denote by A(Ii) the set A(h) and by P (Ii) the player P (h) for any h ∈ Ii. For each
player i ∈ N a utility function ui(z) define the payoff of the terminal state z. A more detailed explanation of these
notations and definitions is presented in section B.
2.2 Strategy and Nash equilibrium
A strategy profile σ = {σi|σi ∈ Σi, i ∈ N} is a collection of strategies for all players, where Σi is the set
of all possible strategies for player i. σ−i refers to strategy of all players other than player i. For play i ∈ N
the strategy σi(Ii) is a function, which assigns an action distribution over A(Ii) to information set Ii. σi(a|h)
denotes the probability of action a taken by player i ∈ N ∪ {c} at state h. In IIG, ∀h1, h2 ∈ Ii , we have
Ii = Ii(h1) = Ii(h2), σi(Ii) = σi(h1) = σi(h2), σi(a|Ii) = σi(a|h1) = σi(a|h2). For iterative method such
as CFR, σt refers to the strategy profile at t-th iteration. The state reach probability of history h is denoted
by piσ(h) if players take actions according to σ. For an empty sequence piσ(∅) = 1. The reach probability can
be decomposed into piσ(h) =
∏
i∈N∪{c} pi
σ
i (h) = pi
σ
i (h)pi
σ
−i(h) according to each player’s contribution, where
piσi (h) =
∏
h′avh,P (h′)=P (h) σi(a|h′) and piσ−i(h) =
∏
h′avh,P (h′) 6=P (h) σ−i(a|h′). The information set reach
probability of Ii is defined as piσ(Ii) =
∑
h∈Ii pi
σ(h). If h′ v h, the interval state reach probability from state h′
to h is defined as piσ(h′, h), then we have piσ(h′, h) = piσ(h)/piσ(h′). piσi (Ii), pi
σ
−i(Ii), pi
σ
i (h
′, h), and piσ−i(h
′, h) are
defined similarly.
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2.3 Counterfactual Regret Minimization
In large and zero-sum IIG, CFR is proved to be an efficient method to compute Nash equilibrium (Zinkevich et al.,
2007; Brown & Sandholm, 2017). We present some key ideas of this method as follows.
Lemma 1: The state reach probability of one player is proportional to posterior probability of the opponent’s hidden
variable, i.e., p(hv−i|Ii) ∝ piσ−i(h), where hvi and Ii indicate a particular h. (see the proof in section G.1)
For player i and strategy profile σ, the counterfactual value (CFV) vσi (h) at state h is define as
vσi (h) =
∑
hvz,z∈Z
piσ−i(h)pi
σ(h, z)ui(z) =
∑
hvz,z∈Z
piσi (h, z)u
′
i(z). (1)
where u′i(z) = pi
σ
−i(z)ui(z) is the expected reward of player i with respective to the approximated posterior
distribution of the opponent’s hidden variable. The action counterfactual value of taking action a is vσi (a|h) =
vσi (ha) and the regret of taking this action is r
σ
i (a|h) = vσi (a|h)− vσi (h). Similarly, the CFV of information set Ii is
vσi (Ii) =
∑
h∈Ii v
σ
i (h) and the regret is r
σ
i (a|Ii) =
∑
z∈Z,havz,h∈Ii pi
σ
i (ha, z)u
′
i(z)−
∑
z∈Z,hvz,h∈Ii pi
σ
i (h, z)u
′
i(z).
Then the cumulative regret of action a after T iterations is
RTi (a|Ii) =
T∑
t=1
(vσ
t
i (a|Ii)− vσ
t
i (Ii)) = R
T−1
i (a|Ii) + rσ
T
i (a|Ii). (2)
where R0i (a|Ii) = 0. Define RT,+i (a|Ii) = max(RTi (a|Ii), 0), the current strategy (or behavior strategy) at T + 1
iteration will be updated by
σT+1i (a|Ii) =

RT,+i (a|Ii)∑
a∈A(Ii) R
T,+
i (a|Ii)
if
∑
a∈A(Ii)R
T,+
i (a|Ii) > 0
1
|A(Ii)| otherwise.
(3)
The average strategy σ¯iT from iteration 1 to T is defined as:
σ¯i
T (a|Ii) =
∑T
t=1 pi
σt
i (Ii)σ
t
i(a|Ii)∑T
t=1 pi
σt
i (Ii)
. (4)
where piσ
t
i (Ii) denotes the information set reach probability of Ii at t-th iteration and is used to weight the
corresponding current strategy σti(a|Ii). Define sti(a|Ii) = piσ
t
i (Ii)σ
t
i(a|Ii) as the additional numerator in iteration t,
then the cumulative numerator can be defined as
ST (a|Ii) =
T∑
t=1
piσ
t
i (Ii)σ
t
i(a|Ii) = ST−1(a|Ii) + sTi (a|Ii). (5)
where S0(a|Ii) = 0.
2.4 Monte Carlo CFR
When solving a game, CFR needs to traverse the entire game tree in each iteration, which will prevent it from handling
large games with limited memory. To address this challenge, Lanctot et al. (2009) proposed a Monte Carlo CFR to
minimize counterfactual regret. Their method can compute an unbiased estimation of counterfactual value and avoid
traversing the entire game tree. Since only subsets of all information sets are visited in each iteration, this approach
requires less memory than standard CFR.
Define Q = {Q1, Q2, ..., Qm}, where Qj ∈ Z is a block of sampling terminal histories in each iteration, such
that Qj spans the set Z. Generally, different Qj may have an overlap according to the specify sampling schema.
Specifically, in the external sampling and outcome sampling, each block Qj ∈ Q is a partition of Z. Define qQj as
the probability of considering block Qj , where
∑m
j=1 qQj = 1. Define q(z) =
∑
j:z∈Qj qQj as the probability of
considering a particular terminal history z. Specifically, vanilla CFR is a special case of MCCFR, where Q = {Z}
only contain one block and qQ1 = 1. In outcome sampling, only one trajectory will be sampled, such that ∀Qj ∈ Q,|Qj | = 1 and |Qj | = |Z|. For information set Ii, a sample estimate of counterfactual value is v˜σi (Ii|Qj) =∑
h∈Ii,z∈Qj ,hvz
1
q(z)pi
σ
−i(z)pi
σ
i (h, z)ui(z).
Lemma 2: The sampling counterfactual value in MCCFR is the unbiased estimation of actual counterfactual value in
CFR. Ej∼qQj [v˜
σ
i (Ii|Qj)] = vσi (Ii) (Lemma 1, Lanctot et al. (2009).)
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Define σrs as sampling strategy profile, where σrsi is the sampling strategy for player i and σrs−i are the sampling
strategies for players expect i. Particularly, for both external sampling and outcome sampling proposed by (Lanctot
et al., 2009), σrs−i = σ−i. The regret of the sampled action a ∈ A(Ii) is defined as
r˜σi ((a|Ii)|Qj) =
∑
z∈Qj ,havz,h∈Ii
piσi (ha, z)u
rs
i (z)−
∑
z∈Qj ,hvz,h∈Ii
piσi (h, z)u
rs
i (z) , (6)
where ursi (z) =
ui(z)
piσ
rs
i (z)
is a new utility weighted by 1
piσ
rs
i (z)
. The sample estimate for cumulative regret of action a
after T iterations is R˜Ti ((a|Ii)|Qj) = R˜T−1i ((a|Ii)|Qj) + r˜σ
T
i ((a|Ii)|Qj) with R˜0i ((a|Ii)|Qj) = 0.
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Figure 1: (A) tabular based CRF and (B) our double neural based CRF framework.
In this section, we will explain our double neural CFR algorithm, where we employ two neural networks, one for the
cumulative regret, and the other for the average strategy. As shown in Figure 1 (A), standard CFR-family methods
such as CFR (Zinkevich et al., 2007), outcome-sampling MCCFR, external sampling MCCFR (Lanctot et al., 2009),
and CFR+ (Tammelin, 2014) need to use two large tabular-based memoriesMR andMS to record the cumulative
regret and average strategy for all information sets. Such tabular representation makes these methods difficult to apply
to large extensive-form games with limited time and space (Burch, 2017).
In contrast, we will use two deep neural networks to compute approximate Nash equilibrium of IIG as shown in
Figure 1 (B). Different from NFSP, our method is based on the theory of CFR, where the first network is used to
learn the cumulative regret and the other is to learn the cumulative numerator of the average strategy profile. With
the help of these two networks, we do not need to use two large tabular-based memories; instead, we rely on the
generalization ability of the compact neural network to produce the cumulative regret and the average strategy. In
practice, the proposed double neural method can achieve a lower exploitability with fewer iterations than NFSP. In
addition, we present experimentally that our double neural CFR can also continually improve after initialization from
a poor tabular strategy.
3.1 Overall Framework
The iterative updates of the CFR algorithm maintain two strategies: the current strategy σti(a|Ii), and the average
strategy σ¯ti(a|Ii) for ∀i ∈ N, ∀Ii ∈ Ii,∀a ∈ A(Ii),∀t ∈ {1, . . . , T}. Thus, our two neural networks are designed to
maintain these two strategies in iterative fashion. More specifically,
• Current strategy. According to Eq. (3), current strategy σt+1(a|Ii) is computed by the cumulative regret
Rt(a|Ii). We only need to track the numerator in Eq. (3) since the normalization in the denominator can easily
be computed when the strategy is used. Given information set Ii and action a, we design a neural network
RegretSumNetwork(RSN) R(a, Ii|θtR) to learn Rt(a|Ii), where θtR is the parameter in the network at t-th
iteration. As shown Figure 1 (b), define memory MR = {(Ii, r˜σti ((a|Ii)|Qj))|∀i ∈ N, ∀a ∈ A(Ii), h ∈
Ii, h v z, z ∈ Qj}. Each member of MR is the visited information set Ii and the corresponding regret
r˜σ
t
i ((a|Ii)|Qj), where Qj is the sampled block in t-th iteration. According to Eq. (2), we can estimate
R(a, Ii|θt+1R ) using the following optimization:
θt+1R ← argmin
θt+1R
∑
(Ii,r˜
σt
i ((a|Ii)|Qj))∈MR
(
R(a, Ii|θtR) + r˜σ
t
i ((a|Ii)|Qj)−R(a, Ii|θt+1R )
)2
. (7)
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• Average Strategy. According to Eq. (4), the approximate Nash equilibrium is the weighted average
of all previous strategies over T iterations. Similar to the cumulative regret, we employ another deep
neural network AvgStrategyNetwork(ASN) to learn the numerator of the average strategy. DefineMS =
{(Ii, piσti (Ii)σti(a|Ii))|∀i ∈ N, ∀a ∈ A(Ii), h ∈ Ii, h v z, z ∈ Qj}. Each member of MS is the visited
information set Ii and the value of piσ
t
i (Ii)σ
t
i(a|Ii), where Qj is the sampled block in t-th iteration. Then the
parameter θt+1S can estimated by the following optimization:
θt+1S ← argmin
θt+1S
∑
(Ii,sti(a|Ii))∈MS
(
S(a, Ii|θtS) + sti(a|Ii)− S(a, Ii|θt+1S )
)2
. (8)
Remark 1: In each iteration, only a small subset of information sets are sampled, which may lead to the neural
networks forgetting values for those unobserved information sets. To address this problem, we will use the neural
network parameters from the previous iteration as the initialization, which gives an online learning/adaptation flavor
to the updates. Furthermore, due to the generalization ability of the neural networks, even samples from a small number
of information sets are used to update the new neural networks, the newly updated neural networks can produce very
good value for the cumulative regret and the average strategy.
Remark 2: As we increase the number of iterations t, the value ofRti(a|Ii) will become increasingly large, which may
make neural network difficult to learn. To address this problem, we will normalize the cumulative regret by a factor of√
t to make its range more stable. This can be understood from the regret bound of online learning. More specifically,
let ∆ = maxIi,a,t |Rt(a|Ii)−Rt−1(a|Ii)|,∀Ii ∈ I, a ∈ A(Ii), t ∈ {1, . . . , T}. We have Rti(a|Ii) ≤ ∆
√|A|t
according to the Theorem 6 in (Burch, 2017), where |A| = maxIi∈I |A(Ii)|. In practice, we can use the neural
network to track Rˆti(a|Ii) = Rti(a|Ii)/
√
t, and update it by
Rˆti(a|Ii) =
√
t− 1Rˆt−1i (a|Ii)√
t
+
rσ
t
i (a|Ii)√
t
, where Rˆ0i (a|Ii) = 0. (9)
Remark 3: The optimization problem for the double neural networks is different from that in DQN (Mnih et al.,
2015). In DQN, the Q-value for the greedy action is used in the update, while in our setting, we do not use greedy
actions. Algorithm E gives further details on how to optimize the objectives in Eq. (7) and Eq. (8).
Relation between CFR, MCCFR and our double neural method. As shown in Figure 1, these three methods are
based on the CFR framework. The CFR computes counterfactual value and regret by traversing the entire tree in each
iteration, which makes it computationally intensive to be applied to large games directly. MCCFR samples a subset of
information sets and will need less computation than CFR in each iteration. However, both CFR and MCCFR need two
large tabular memories to save the cumulative regrets and the numerators of the average strategy for all information
sets, which prevents these two methods to be used in large games directly. The proposed neural method keeps the
benefit of MCCFR yet without the need for two large tabular memories.
3.2 Recurrent Neural Network Representation for Information Set
In order to define our R and S network, we need to represent the information set Ii ∈ I in extensive-form
games. In such games, players take action in alternating fashion and each player makes a decision according to the
observed history. Because the action sequences vary in length, in this paper, we model them with a recurrent neural
network and each action in the sequence corresponds to a cell in RNN. This architecture is different from the one in
DeepStack (Moravcik et al., 2017), which used a fully connected deep neural network to estimate counterfactual value.
Figure 2 (A) provides an illustration of the proposed deep sequential neural network representation for information
sets. Besides the vanilla RNN, there are several variants of more expressive RNNs, such as the GRU (Cho et al.,
2014) and LSTM (Hochreiter & Schmidhuber, 1997). In our later experiments, we will compare these different neural
architectures as well as a fully connected network representation.
Furthermore, different position in the sequence may contribute differently to the decision making, we will add
an attention mechanism (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Cho et al., 2015) to the RNN architecture to enhance the
representation. For example, the player may need to take a more aggressive strategy after beneficial public cards
are revealed. Thus the information, after the public cards are revealed may be more important. In practice, we find
that the attention mechanism can help the double neural CFR obtain a better convergence rate. In section D, we will
provide more details on neural network architectures.
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Figure 2: (A) the key architecture of the sequential neural networks. (B) an overview of the novel double neural
counterfactual regret minimization method.
3.3 Continual Improvement
With the proposed framework of double neural CFR, it is easy to initialize the neural networks from an existing
strategy profile based on the tabular representation or neural representation. For information set Ii and action a, in an
existing strategy profile, define R′i(a|Ii) as the cumulative regret and S
′
(a|Ii) as the cumulative numerator of average
strategy. We can clone the cumulative regret for all information sets and actions by optimizing
θ∗R ← argmin
θR
∑
i∈N,Ii∈Ii,a∈A(Ii)
(
R(a, Ii|θR)−R′(a|Ii)
)2
. (10)
Similarly, the parameters θ∗S for cloning the cumulative numerator of average strategy can be optimized in the same
way. Based on the learned θ∗R and θ
∗
S , we can warm start the double neural networks and continually improve beyond
the tabular strategy profile.
Remark: In the large extensive game, the initial strategy is obtained from an abstracted game which has a manageable
number of information sets. The abstracted game is generated by domain knowledge, such as clustering similar hand
strength cards into the same buckets. Once the strategy of this abstract game is solved, it can be clone according
to Eq. (10) and improved continuously using our double neural CFR framework.
3.4 Overall Algorithm
Algorithm 1 provides a summary of the proposed double neural counterfactual regret minimization algorithm. In the
first iteration, if the system warm starts from tabular based CFR or MCCFR methods, the techniques in section 3.3 will
be used to clone the cumulative regrets and strategy. If there is no warm start initialization, we can start our algorithm
by randomly initializing the parameters in RSN and ASN at iteration t = 1. Then sampling methods will return the
counterfactual regret and the numerator of average strategy for the sampled information sets in this iteration, and they
will be saved in memoriesMR andMS respectively. Then these samples will be used by the NeuralAgent algorithm
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from Algorithm 2 to optimize RSN and ASN. Further details for the sampling methods and the NeuralAgent fitting
algorithm will be discussed in the next section.
Algorithm 1: Counterfactual Regret Minimization with Two Deep Neural Networks
1 Function Agent(T , b):
2 For t = 1 to T do
3 if t = 1 and using warm starting then
4 initialize θtR and θ
t
S from an existing checkpoint
5 t← t+ 1 . skip cold starting
6 else
7 initialize θtR and θ
t
S randomly.
8 MR,MS ← sampling methods for CFV and average strategy. . such as Algorithm3
9 sum aggregate the value inMR by information set. . according to the Lemma 5 and Equation 12
10 remove duplicated records inMS .
11 θtR ← NeuralAgent(R(·|θt−1R ),MR, θt−1R , β∗R) . update θtR using Algorithm2
12 θtS ← NeuralAgent(S(·|θt−1S ),MS , θt−1S , β∗S ) . update θtS using Algorithm2
13 return θtR, θtS
4 Efficient Training
In this section, we will propose two techniques to improve the efficiency of the double neural method. These techniques
can also be used separately in other CFR-based methods.
4.1 Robust Sampling Techniques
In this paper, we proposed a new robust sampling technique which has lower variance than outcome sampling, while
being more memory efficient than the external sampling. In this robust sampling method, the sampling profile is
defined as σrs(k) = (σrs(k)i , σ−i), where player i will randomly select k actions according to sampling strategy
σ
rs(k)
i (Ii) for each information set Ii and other players will randomly select one action according to strategy σ−i.
Specifically, if player i randomly selects min(k, |A(Ii)|) actions according to discrete uniform distribution
unif(0, |A(Ii)|) at information set Ii, i.e., σrs(k)i (a|Ii) = min(k,|A(Ii)|)|A(Ii)| , then
piσ
rs(k)
i (Ii) =
∏
h∈Ii,h′vh,h′avh,h′∈I′i
min(k, |A(I ′i)|)
|A(I ′i)| (11)
and the weighted utility urs(k)i (z) will be a constant number in each iteration, which has a low variance. In addition,
because the weighted utility no longer requires explicit knowledge of the opponent’s strategy, we can use this sampling
method for online regret minimization. For simplicity, k = max refers to k = maxIi∈I |A(Ii)| in the following
sections.
Lemma 3: If k = max and ∀i ∈ N, ∀Ii ∈ Ii,∀a ∈ A(Ii), σrs(k)i (a|Ii) ∼ unif(0, |A(Ii)|), then robust sampling is
the same as external sampling.
Lemma 4: If k = 1 and σrs(k)i = σi, then robust sampling is the same as outcome sampling.
Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 provide the relationship between outcome sampling, external sampling, and the proposed
robust sampling algorithm. The detailed theoretical analysis are presented in Appendix G.2.
4.2 Mini-batch Techniques
Mini-batch MCCFR: Traditional outcome sampling and external sampling only sample one block in an iteration and
provide an unbiased estimator of origin CFV according to Lemma 2. In this paper, we present a mini-batch Monte
Carlo technique and randomly sample b blocks in one iteration. Let Qj denote a block of terminals sampled according
to the scheme in section 4.1 at j−th time, then mini-batch CFV with b mini-batches for information set Ii can be
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defined as
v˜σi (Ii|b) =
1
b
b∑
j=1
 ∑
h∈Ii,z∈Qj ,hvz
piσ−i(z)pi
σ
i (h, z)ui(z)
q(z)
 = b∑
j=1
v˜σi (Ii|Qj)
b
. (12)
Furthermore, we can show that v˜σi (Ii|b) is an unbiased estimator of the counterfactual value of Ii: Lemma 5:
EQj∼Robust Sampling[v˜σi (Ii|b)] = vσi (Ii). (see the proof in section G.3) Similarly, the cumulative mini-batch regret
of action a is
R˜Ti ((a|Ii)|b) = R˜T−1i ((a|Ii)|b) + v˜σ
T
i ((a|Ii)|b)− v˜σ
T
i (Ii|b) , (13)
where R˜0i ((a|Ii)|b) = 0. In practice, mini-batch technique can sample b blocks in parallel and help MCCFR to
converge faster.
Mini-Batch MCCFR+: When optimizing counterfactual regret, CFR+ (Tammelin, 2014) substitutes the
regret-matching algorithm (Hart & Mas-Colell, 2000) with regret-matching+ and can converge faster than CFR.
However, Burch (2017) showed that MCCFR+ actually converge slower than MCCFR when mini-batch is not used.
In our paper, we derive mini-batch version of MCCFR+ which updates cumulative mini-batch regret R˜T,+((a|Ii)|b)
up to iteration T by
R˜T,+((a|Ii)|b) =
{(
v˜σ
T
i ((a|Ii)|b)− v˜σ
T
i (Ii|b)
)+
if T = 0(
R˜T−1,+i ((a|Ii)|b) + v˜σ
T
i ((a|Ii)|b)− v˜σ
T
i (Ii|b)
)+
if T > 0
(14)
where (x)+ = max(x, 0). In practice, we find that mini-batch MCCFR+ converges faster than mini-batch MCCFR
when specifying a suitable mini-batch size.
5 Experiment
The proposed double neural CFR algorithm will be evaluated in the One-Card-Poker game with 5 cards and a large
No-Limit Leduc Hold’em (NLLH) with stack size 5, 10, and 15. The largest NLLH in our experiment has over 2×107
states and 3.7 × 106 information sets. We will compare it with tabular CFR and deep reinforcement learning based
method such as NFSP. The experiments show that the proposed double neural algorithm can converge to comparable
results produced by its tabular counterpart while performing much better than deep reinforcement learning method.
With the help of neural networks, our method has a strong generalization ability to converge to an approximate Nash
equilibrium by using fewer parameters than the number of information sets. The current results open up the possibility
for a purely neural approach to directly solve large IIG. Due to space limit, we present experimental results for
One-Card-Poker and the analysis in section C. The hyperparameters and setting about the neural networks can be
found in section E.
Settings. To simplify the expression, the abbreviations of different methods are defined as follows. XFP refers
to the full-width extensive-form fictitious play method. NFSP refers to the reinforcement learning based fictitious
self-play method. RS-MCCFR refers to the proposed robust sampling MCCFR. This method with regret matching+
acceleration technique is denoted by RS-MCCFR+. These methods only containing one neural network are denoted
by RS-MCCFR+-RSN and RS-MCCFR+-ASN respectively. RS-MCCFR+-RSN-ASN refers to the proposed
double neural MCCFR. According to Lemma 3, if k = max, ES-MCCFR is the same with RS-MCCFR. More
specifically, we investigated the following questions.
Is mini-batch sampling helpful? Figure 3(A) presents the convergence curves of the proposed robust sampling
method with k = max under different mini-batch sizes (b=1, 1000, 5000, 10000 respectively). The experimental
results show that larger batch sizes generally lead to better strategy profiles. Furthermore, the convergence for b =
5000 is as good as b = 10000. Thus in the later experiments, we set the mini-batch size equal to 5000.
Is robust sampling helpful? Figure 3 (B) and (C) presents convergence curves for outcome sampling, external
sampling(k = max) and the proposed robust sampling method under the different number of sampled actions. The
outcome sampling cannot converge to a low exploitability smaller than 0.1 after 1000 iterations. The proposed robust
sampling algorithm with k = 1, which only samples one trajectory like the outcome sampling, can achieve a better
strategy profile after the same number of iterations. With an increasing k, the robust sampling method achieves an
even better convergence rate. Experiment results show k = 3 and 5 have a similar trend with k = max, which
demonstrates that the proposed robust sampling achieves similar strategy profile but requires less memory than the
external sampling. We choose k = 3 for the later experiments in Leduc Hold’em Poker. Figure 3 (C) presents the
results in a different way and displays the relation between exploitability and the cumulative number of touched nodes.
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A B C
Figure 3: Comparison of different CFR-family methods in Leduc Hold’em. (A) Performance of robust sampling with
different batch size. (B) Performance of robust sampling with different parameter k by iteration. (C) Performance by
the number of touched node.
The robust sampling with small k is just as good as the external sampling while being more memory efficient on the
condition that each algorithm touches the same number of nodes.
A B C
Figure 4: Performance of different methods in Leduc Hold’em. (A) comparison of NSFP, XFP and the proposed
double neural method. (B) each contribution of RSN and ASN. (C) continue improvement from tabular based CFR
and RS-MCCFR+.
How does double neural CRF compare to the tabular counterpart, XFP, and NFSP? To obtain an approximation
of Nash equilibrium, Figure 4(A) demonstrates that NFSP needs 106 iterations to reach a 0.06-Nash equilibrium, and
requires 2 × 105 state-action pair samples and 2 × 106 samples for supervised learning respectively. The XFP needs
103 iterations to obtain the same exploitability, however, this method is the precursor of NFSP and updated by a tabular
9
based full-width fictitious play. Our proposed neural method only needs 200 iterations to achieve the same performance
which shows that the proposed double neural algorithm converges significantly better than the reinforcement learning
counterpart. In practice, our double neural method can achieve an exploitability of 0.02 after 1000 iterations, which is
similar to the tabular method.
What is the individual effect of RSN and ASN? Figure 4(B) presents ablation study of the effects of RSN and ASN
network respectively. Both MCCFR+-RSN and MCCFR+-ASN, which only employ one neural network, perform
only slightly better than the double neural method. All the proposed neural methods can match the performance of the
tabular based method.
How well does continual improvement work? In practice, we usually want to continually improve our strategy
profile from an existing checkpoint (Brown & Sandholm, 2016). In the framework of the proposed neural
counterfactual regret minimization algorithm, warm starting is easy and friendly. Firstly, we employ two neural
networks to clone the existing tabular based cumulative regret and the numerator of average strategy by optimizing
Eq. (10). Then the double neural methods can continually improve the tabular based methods. As shown in Figure
4(C), warm start from either full-width based or sampling based CFR the existing can lead to continual improvements.
Specifically, the first 10 iterations are learned by tabular based CFR and RS-MCCFR+. The remaining iterations are
continually improved by the double neural method, where b = 5000, k = max.
A B C D5
1
0.1
1
0.5
0.1
0.1
1
0.1
1
0.5
0.5
Figure 5: Performance analysis from different perspectives: (A) Generalization: by observed nodes. (B) Compression:
by embedding size. (C) Large Game: by game size. (D) Architecture: by attention or not.
Do the neural networks generalize to unseen information sets? To investigate the generalization ability, we perform
the neural CFR with small mini-batch sizes (b=50, 100, 500), where only 3.08%, 5.59%, and 13.06% information sets
are observed in each iteration. In all these settings, the double neural can still converge and arrive at exploitability less
than 0.1 within only 1000 iterations (Figure 5(A)).
Do the neural networks just memorize but not generalize? One indication that the neural networks are generalizing
is that they use much fewer parameters than their tabular counterparts. We experimented with LSTM plus attention
networks, and embedding size of 8 and 16 respectively. These architectures contain 1048 and 2608 parameters
respectively in NLLH(5), both of which are much less than the tabular memory (more than 104 number here). Note
that both these two embedding sizes still leads to a converging strategy profile as shown in Figure 5(B).
Does neural method converge in the larger game? Figure 5(C) presents the log-log convergence curve of NLLH
with different stack size (5, 10 and 15 respectively). The largest game size contains over 2× 107 states and 3.7× 106
information sets. Let mini-batch size be 500, there are 13.06%, 2.39% and 0.53% information sets that are observed
respectively in each iteration. Even though only a small subset of nodes are sampled, the double neural method can
still converge.
Is attention in the neural architecture helpful? Figure 5(D) presents the convergence curves of several different deep
neural architectures, such as a fully connected deep neural network(FC), LSTM, LSTM plus attention, original RNN
plus attention, and GRU plus attention. The recurrent neural network plus attention helps us obtain better strategies
rate than other architectures after hundreds of iterations.
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6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we present a novel double neural counterfactual regret minimization method to solve large imperfect
information game, which has a strong generalization and compression ability and can match the performance of
tabular based CFR approach. We also developed a new sampling technique which has lower variance than the outcome
sampling, while being more memory efficient than the external sampling. In the future, we plan to explore much more
flexible methods and apply the double neural method to larger games, such as No-Limit Texas Hold’em.
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Appendix A Game Rules
Leduc Hold’em a two-players IIG of poker, which was first introduced in (Southey et al., 2012). In Leduc Hold’em,
there is a deck of 6 cards comprising two suits of three ranks. The cards are often denoted by king, queen, and jack.
In No-Limit Leduc Hold’em(NLLH), the player may wager any amount of chips up to a maximum of that player’s
remaining stack. There is also no limit on the number of raises or bets in each betting round. There are two rounds. In
the first betting round, each player is dealt one card from a deck of 6 cards. In the second betting round, a community
(or public) card is revealed from a deck of the remaining 4 cards. In this paper, we use NLLH(x) refer to the No-Limit
Leduc Hold’em, whose stack size is x.
One-Card Poker is a two-players IIG of poker described by (Gordon, 2005). The game rules are defined as follows.
Each player is dealt one card from a deck of X cards. The first player can pass or bet, If the first player bet, the second
player can call or fold. If the first player pass, the second player can pass or bet. If second player bet, the first player
can fold or call. The game ends with two pass, call, fold. The fold player will lose 1 chips. If the game ended with
two passes, the player with higher card win 1 chips, If the game end with call, the player with higher card win 2 chips.
Appendix B Definition of Extensive-Form Games
player 0
player 1
chance
𝒉𝟎
𝒉𝟏
ℎ3 ℎ4
𝒉𝟕𝒛𝟏 𝒛𝟐
F C
P B
P B F C
𝒉𝟐
𝒉𝟓 𝒉𝟔
𝒉𝟖
F C
P B
P B F C
𝒛𝟑 𝒛𝟒 𝒛𝟓 𝒛𝟔
𝒛𝟕 𝒛𝟖 𝒛𝟗 𝒛𝟏𝟎
𝒉𝟎
𝒉′𝟏
𝒉′𝟑 𝒉′𝟒
𝒉′𝟕𝒛′𝟏 𝒛′𝟐
F C
P B
P B F C
𝒉′𝟐
𝒉′𝟓 𝒉′𝟔
𝒉′𝟖
F C
P B
P B F C
𝒛′𝟑 𝒛′𝟒 𝒛′𝟓 𝒛′𝟔
𝒛′𝟕 𝒛′𝟖 𝒛′𝟗 𝒛′𝟏𝟎
Figure 6: Illustration of extensive-form game. The left and right denote two different kinds of dealt private cards.
We use same color other than gray for each state in the same information set. F, C, P, B refer to fold, call, pass, bet
respectively.
B.1 Additional Definitions
For player i, the expected game utility uσi =
∑
z∈Z pi
σ(z)ui(z) of σ is the expected payoff of all possible terminal
nodes. Given a fixed strategy profile σ−i, any strategy σ∗i = arg maxσ′i∈Σi u
(σ′i,σ−i)
i of player i that achieves maximize
payoff against piσ−i is a best response. For two players’ extensive-form games, a Nash equilibrium is a strategy
profile σ∗ = (σ∗0 , σ
∗
1) such that each player’s strategy is a best response to the opponent. An -Nash equilibrium is
an approximation of a Nash equilibrium, whose strategy profile σ∗ satisfies: ∀i ∈ N , uσ∗ii +  ≥ maxσ′i∈Σi u
(σ′i,σ−i)
i .
Exploitability of a strategy σi is defined as i(σi) = uσ
∗
i − u
(σi,σ
∗
−i)
i . A strategy is unexploitable if i(σi) = 0. In
large two player zero-sum games such poker, uσ
∗
i is intractable to compute. However, if the players alternate their
positions, the value of a pair of games is zeros, i.e., uσ
∗
0 + u
σ∗
1 = 0 . We define the exploitability of strategy profile σ
as (σ) = (u(σ0,σ
∗
1 )
1 + u
(σ∗0 ,σ1)
0 )/2.
B.2 Explanation by Example
To provide a more detailed explanation, Figure 6 presents an illustration of a partial game tree in One-Card Poker. In
the first tree, two players are dealt (queen, jack) as shown in the left subtree and (queen, king) as shown in the right
subtree. zi denotes terminal node and hi denotes non-terminal node. There are 19 distinct nodes, corresponding 9
non-terminal nodes including chance h0 and 10 terminal nodes in the left tree. The trajectory from the root to each
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node is a history of actions. In an extensive-form game, hi refers to this history. For example, h3 consists of actions
0:Q, 1:J and P. h7 consists of actions 0:Q, 1:J, P and B. h8 consists of actions 0:Q, 1:K, P and B. We have h3 v h7,
A(h7) = {P,B} and P (h3) = 1
In IIG, the private card of player 1 is invisible to player 0, therefore h7 and h8 are actually the same for player 0. We
use information set to denote the set of these undistinguished states. Similarly, h1 and h2 are in the same information
set. For the right tree of Figure 6, h′3 and h
′
5 are in the same information set. h
′
4 and h
′
6 are in the same information
set.
Generally, any Ii ∈ I could only remember the information observed by player i including player i′s hidden variable
and public actions. For example, the information set of h7 and h8 indicates a sequence of 0:Q, P, and B. Because h7
and h8 are undistinguished by player 0 in IIG, all the states have a same strategy. For example, I0 is the information
set of h7 and h8, we have I0 = I0(h7) = I0(h8), σ0(I0) = σ0(h7) = σ0(h8), σ0(a|I0) = σ0(a|h7) = σ0(a|h8).
Appendix C Additional Experiment Details
C.1 Feature Encoding of Poker Games
The feature is encoded as following. As shown in the figure 2 (A), for a history h and player P (h), we use one-hot
encoding (Harris & Harris) to represent the observed actions including chance player. For example, the input feature
xl for l-th cell is the concatenation of three one-hot features including the given private cards, the revealed public cards
and current action a. Both the private cards and public cards are encoded by one-hot technique, where the value in
the existing position is 1 and the others are 0. If there are no public cards, the respective position will be filled with 0.
Because the action taking by chance is also a cell in the proposed sequential model. Thus in a No-Limit poker, such as
Leduc Hold’em, action a could be any element in {fold, cumulative spent} ∪ {public cards} , where cumulative spent
denotes the total chips after making a call or raise. The length of the encoding vector of action a is the quantities of
public cards plus 2, where cumulative spent is normalized by the stack size.
C.2 Additional Experiment Results
A B C
Figure 7: Comparison of different CFR-family methods and neural network methods in One-Card-Poker. (A)
Comparison of the robust sampling with different mini-batch size. (B) Comparison of the outcome sampling and
the robust sampling with different sample actions k. (C) Comparison of tabular based RS-MCCFR+ and the double
neural method.
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Figure 7 (A) presents the convergence rate for the proposed robust sampling method of different mini-batch size
b = (1, 100, 500, 1000). The experimental results are similar to Leduc Hold’em poker, larger mini-batch size indicates
a better exploitability.
Figure 7 (B) demonstrates that the convergence rate for different sampling methods including outcome sampling and
robust sampling under k = 1, 2. The conclusion is that RS-MCCFR+ converges significantly faster than OS-MCCFR+
after touching the same number of nodes. Experiment results show that k = 1 has a similar trend with k = 2 (external
sampling). Because only one trajectory is sampled, the proposed RS-MCCFR+ will require less memory than the
external sampling.
Figure 7 (C) compares the performance between the tabular method and the double neural method. Experimental
results demonstrate that RS-MCCFR+-RSN-ASN can achieve an exploitability of less than 0.0004 in One-Card Poker,
which matches the performance of the tabular method. For RSN and ASN, we set neural batch size 4, hidden size 32
and learning rate 0.001.
Appendix D Details of Recurrent Neural Network
In order to define our R and S network, we need to represent the information set Ii ∈ I in extensive-form games.
In such games, players take action in alternating fashion and each player makes a decision according to the observed
history. In this paper, we model the behavior sequence as a recurrent neural network and each action in the sequence
corresponds to a cell in RNN. Figure 2 (A) provides an illustration of the proposed deep sequential neural network
representation for information sets.
In standard RNN, the recurrent cell will have a very simple structure, such as a single tanh or sigmoid layer. Hochreiter
& Schmidhuber (1997) proposed a long short-term memory method (LSTM) with the gating mechanism, which
outperforms the standard version and is capable of learning long-term dependencies. Thus we will use LSTM for the
representation. Furthermore, different position in the sequence may contribute differently to the decision making, we
will add an attention mechanism (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Cho et al., 2015) to the LSTM architecture to enhance
the representation. For example, the player may need to take a more aggressive strategy after beneficial public cards
are revealed. Thus the information, after the public cards are revealed may be more important.
More specifically, for l-th cell, define xl as the input vector (which can be either player or chance actions), el as
the hidden layer embedding, φ∗ as a general nonlinear function. Each action is represented by a LSTM cell, which
has the ability to remove or add information to the cell state with three different gates. Define the notation · as
element-wise product. The first forgetting gate layer is defined as gfl = φf (w
f [xl, el−1]), where [xl, el−1] denotes
the concatenation of xl and el−1. The second input gate layer decides which values to update and is defined as
gil = φi(w
i[xl, el−1]). A nonlinear layer output a vector of new candidate values C˜l = φc(wl[xl, el−1]) to decide
what can be added to the state. After the forgetting gate and the input gate, the new cell state is updated by Cl =
gfl ·Cl−1 + gil · C˜l. The third output gate is defined as gol = φo(wo[xl, el−1]). Finally, the updated hidden embedding
is el = gol · φe(Cl). As shown in Figure 2 (A), for each LSTM cell j, the vector of attention weight is learned by
an attention network. Each member in this vector is a scalar αj = φa(waej). The attention embedding of l-th cell
is then defined as eal =
∑l
j=1 αj · ej , which is the summation of the hidden embedding ej and the learned attention
weight αj . The final output of the network is predicted by a value network, which is defined as
y˜l := f(a, Ii|θ) = wyφv(eal ) = wyφv
 l∑
j=1
φa(w
aej) · ej
 , (15)
where θ is the parameters in the defined sequential neural networks. Specifically, φf , φi, φo are sigmoid functions.
φc and φe are hyperbolic tangent functions. φa and φv are rectified linear functions. The proposed RSN and ASN
share the same neural architecture, but use different parameters. That isR(a, Ii|θtR) = f(a, Ii|θtR) and S(a, Ii|θtS) =
f(a, Ii|θtS). R(·, Ii|θtR) and S(·, Ii|θtS) denote two vectors of inference value for all a ∈ A(Ii).
Appendix E Neural Agent for Optimizing Neural Representation
Define βepoch as training epoch, βlr as learning rate, βloss as the criteria for early stopping, βre as the upper bound
for the number of iterations from getting the minimal loss last time, θt−1 as the parameter to optimize, f(·|θt−1) as
the neural network, M as the training sample consisting information set and the corresponding target. To simplify
notations, we use β∗ to denote the set of hyperparameters in the proposed deep neural networks. β∗R and β
∗
S refer to
the sets of hyperparameters in RSN and ASN respectively. According to our experiments, we find a carefully designed
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Algorithm 2: Optimization of Deep Neural Network
1 Function NeuralAgent(f(·|θT−1),M, θT−1, β∗):
2 initialize optimizer, scheduler . gradient descent optimizer and learning rate scheduler
3 θT ← θT−1, lbest ←∞, tbest ← 0 . warm starting from the checkpoint of the last iteration
4 For t = 1 to βepoch do
5 loss← [] . initialize loss as an empty list
6 For each training epoch do
7 {x(i), y(i)}mi=1 ∼M . sampling a mini-batch fromM
8 batch loss← 1m
∑m
i=1(f(x
(i)|θT−1) + y(i) − f(x(i)|θT ))2
9 back propagation batch loss with learning rate lr
10 clip gradient of θT to [−, ]d . d is the dimension of θT
11 optimizer(batch loss)
12 loss.append(batch loss)
13 lr ← sheduler(lr) . reduce learning rate adaptively when loss has stopped improving
14 if avg(loss) < βloss then
15 θTbest ← θT , early stopping. . if loss is small enough, using early stopping mechanism.
16 else if avg(loss) < lbest then
17 lbest = avg(loss), tbest ← t, θTbest ← θT
18 if t− tbest > βre then
19 lr ← βlr . reset learning rate to escape from potential saddle point or local minima.
20 return θT
optimization method can help us obtain a relatively higher convergence rate of exploitability. Algorithm 2 presents the
details of how to optimize the proposed neural networks.
BothR(a, Ii|θt+1R ) and S(a, Ii|θtS) are optimized by mini-batch stochastic gradient descent method. In this paper, we
use Adam optimizer (Kingma & Ba, 2014) with both momentum and adaptive learning rate. Some other optimizers
such as Nadam, RMSprop, Nadam from (Ruder, 2017) are also tried in our experiments, however, they do not achieve
better experimental results. In practice, existing optimizers may not return a relatively low enough loss because of
potential saddle point or local minima. To obtain a relatively higher accuracy and lower optimization loss, we use a
carefully designed scheduler to reduce the learning rate when the loss has stopped decrease. Specifically, the scheduler
reads a metrics quantity, e.g, mean squared error, and if no improvement is seen for a number of epochs, the learning
rate is reduced by a factor. In addition, we will reset the learning rate in both optimizer and scheduler once loss stops
decrease in βre epochs. Gradient clipping mechanism is used to limit the magnitude of the parameter gradient and
make optimizer behave better in the vicinity of steep cliffs. After each epoch, the best parameter will be updated.
Early stopping mechanism is used once the lowest loss is less than the specified criteria βloss.
In experiments, we set the network hyperparameters as follow. For RSN, we set the hyperparameters as follows:
neural batch size is 256 and learning rate βlr = 0.001. A scheduler, who will reduce the learning rate based on the
number of epochs and the convergence rate of loss, help the neural agent to obtain a high accuracy. The learning rate
will be reduced by 0.5 when loss has stopped improving after 10 epochs. The lower bound on the learning rate of all
parameters in this scheduler is 10−6. To avoid the algorithm converging to potential local minima or saddle point, we
will reset the learning rate to 0.001 and help the optimizer to learn a better performance. θTbest is the best parameters to
achieve the lowest loss after T epochs. If average loss for epoch t is less than the specified criteria βloss=10−4, we will
early stop the optimizer. We set βepoch = 2000 and update the optimizer 2000 maximum epochs. For ASN, we set
the loss of early stopping criteria as 10−5. The learning rate will be reduced by 0.7 when loss has stopped improving
after 15 epochs. Other hyperparameters in ASN are similar to RSN.
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Appendix F Optimize Counterfactual Regret Minimization with Two Deep Neural
Networks
Algorithm 3: Mini-Batch RS-MCCFR with Double Neural Networks
1 Function Mini-Batch-MCCFR-NN(t):
2 MR ← ∅,MS ← ∅
3 For all i = 1 to b do in parallel then
4 MCCFR-NN(t, ∅, 0, 1, 1)
5 MCCFR-NN(t, ∅, 1, 1, 1)
6 returnMR,MS
7
8 Function MCCFR-NN(t, h, i, pii, pi
rs(k)
i ):
9 Ii ← Ii(h) . information set at state h
10 if h ∈ Z then
11 return ui(h)
pi
rs(k)
i
. return game payoff
12 else if P (h) = −1 then
13 a ∼ σ−i(Ii) . Sample an action from σ−i(h)
14 return MCCFR-NN(t, ha, i, pii, pi
rs(k)
i )
15 else if P (h) = i then
16 Rˆi(·|Ii)← R(·, Ii|θtR) if t > 1 else
−→
0 . inference the vector of cumulative regret ∀a ∈ A(Ii)
17 σi(Ii)←CalculateStrategy(Rˆi(·|Ii), Ii) . calculate current strategy
18 vi(h)← 0, ri(·|Ii)← ~0, si(·|Ii)← ~0 . ri(·|Ii) and i(·|Ii) are two vectors overA(Ii)
19 Ars(k)(Ii)← sampling k different actions according to σrs(k)i
20 For a ∈ Ars(k)(Ii) do
21 vi(a|h)←MCCFR-NN(t, ha, i, piiσi(a|Ii), pirsi σrs(k)i (a|Ii))
22 vi(h)← vi(h) + vi(a|h)σi(a|Ii) . update counterfactual value
23 For a ∈ Ars(k)(Ii) do
24 ri(a|Ii)← vi(a|h)− vi(h) . update cumulative regret
25 si(a|Ii)← piσi (Ii)σi(a|Ii) . update average strategy numerator
26 Store updated cumulative regret tuple (Ii, ri(·|Ii)) inMR
27 Store updated current strategy dictionary (Ii, si(·|Ii)) inMS
28 return vi(h)
29 else
30 Rˆ−i(·|Ii)← R(·, Ii|θtR) if t > 1 else
−→
0 . inference cumulative regret
31 σ−i(Ii)←CalculateStrategy(Rˆ−i(·|Ii), Ii) . calculate current strategy
32 a ∼ σ−i(Ii) . Sample an action from σ−i(Ii)
33 return MCCFR-NN(t, ha, i, pii, pi
rs(k)
i )
34
35 Function CalculateStrategy(Ri(·|Ii), Ii):
36 sum←∑a∈A(Ii) max(Ri(a|Ii), 0)
37 For a ∈ A(Ii) do
38 σi(a|Ii) = max(Ri(a|Ii),0)sum if sum > 0 else 1|A(Ii)|
39 return σi(Ii)
40
Algorithm 3 presents one application scenario of the proposed double neural method, which is based on the proposed
mini-batch robust sampling method. The function MCCFR-NN will traverse the game tree like tabular MCCFR, which
starts from the root history h = ∅. Define Ii as the information set of h. Suppose that player i will sample k actions
according to the robust sampling. Then the function can be defined as follows. (1) If the history is terminal, the
function returns the weighted utility. (2) If the history is the chance player, one action a ∈ A(Ii) will be sampled
according to the strategy σ−i(Ii). Then this action will be added to the history, i.e., h ← ha. (3) If P (Ii) = i, the
17
current strategy can be updated by the cumulative regret predicted by RSN. Then we sample k actions according the
specified sampling strategy profile σrs(k)i . After a recursive updating, we can obtain the counterfactual value and regret
of each action at Ii. For the visited node, their counterfactual regrets and numerators of the corresponding average
strategy will be stored inMR andMS respectively. (4) If P (Ii) is the opponent, only one action will be sampled
according the strategy σ−i(Ii).
The function Mini-Batch-MCCFR-NN presents a mini-batch sampling method, where b blocks will be sampled in
parallel. This mini-batch method can help the MCCFR to achieve a more accurate estimation of CFV. The parallel
sampling makes this method efficient in practice.
Appendix G Theoretical Analysis
G.1 Reach Probability and Posterior Probability
Lemma 1: The state reach probability of one player is proportional to posterior probability of the opponent’s hidden
variable, i.e., p(hv−i|Ii) ∝ piσ−i(h).
Proof: For player i at information set Ii and fixed i′s strategy profile σi, i.e., ∀h ∈ Ii, piσi (h) is constant. Based
on the defination of extensive-form game in Section 2.1, the cominbation of Ii and opponent’s hidden state hv−i can
indicate a particular history h = hvi h
v
−ia0a1...aL−1. With Bayes’ Theorem, we can inference the posterior probability
of opponent’s private cards with Equation16
p(hv−i|Ii) =
p(hv−i, Ii)
p(Ii)
=
p(h)
p(Ii)
∝ p(h)
∝ p(hvi )p(hv−i)
L∏
l=1
σP (hvi hv−ia0a1...al−1)(al|hvi hv−ia0a1...al−1)
∝ piσ(h) = piσi (h)piσ−i(h)
∝ piσ−i(h)
(16)
G.2 Robust Sampling, outcome sampling and external sampling
Lemma 3: If k = maxIi∈I |A(Ii)| and ∀i ∈ N, ∀Ii ∈ Ii,∀a ∈ A(Ii), σrs(k)i (a|Ii) ∼ unif(0, |A(Ii)|), then robust
sampling is same with external sampling. (see the proof in section G.2)
Lemma 4: If k = 1 and σrs(k)i = σi, then robust sampling is same with outcome sampling. (see the proof in section
G.2)
For robust sampling, given strategy profile σ and the sampled block Qj according to sampling profile σrs(k) =
(σ
rs(k)
i , σ−i), then q(z) = pi
σrs(k)
i (z)pi
σ
−i(z), and the regret of action a ∈ Ars(k)(Ii) is
r˜σi ((a|Ii)|Qj) = v˜σi ((a|Ii)|Qj)− v˜σi (Ii|Qj)
=
∑
z∈Qj ,havz,h∈Ii
1
q(z)
piσ−i(z)pi
σ
i (ha, z)ui(z)−
∑
z∈Qj ,hvz
1
q(z)
piσ−i(z)pi
σ
i (h, z)ui(z)
=
∑
z∈Qj ,havz,h∈Ii
ui(z)
piσ
rs(k)
i (z)
piσi (ha, z)−
∑
z∈Qj ,hvz,h∈Ii
ui(z)
piσ
rs(k)
i (z)
piσi (h, z)
=
∑
z∈Qj ,havz,h∈Ii
piσi (ha, z)u
rs
i (z)−
∑
z∈Qj ,hvz,h∈Ii
piσi (h, z)u
rs
i (z),
(17)
where ursi (z) =
ui(z)
piσ
rs(k)
i (z)
is the weighted utility according to reach probability piσ
rs(k)
i (z). Because the weighted
utility no long requires explicit knowledge of the opponent’s strategy, we can use this sampling method for online
regret minimization.
Generally, if player i randomly selects min(k, |A(Ii)|) actions according to discrete uniform distribution
unif(0, |A(Ii)|) at information set Ii, i.e., σrs(k)i (a|Ii) = min(k,|A(Ii)|)|A(Ii)| , then
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piσ
rs(k)
i (Ii) =
∏
h∈Ii,h′vh,h′avh,h′∈I′i
min(k, |A(I ′i)|)
|A(I ′i)| (18)
and ursi (z) is a constant number when given the sampling profile σ
rs(k).
Specifically,
• if k = maxIi∈I |A(Ii)|, then σrs(k)i (Ii) = 1, urs(k)i (z) = ui(z), and
r˜σi ((a|Ii)|Qj) =
∑
z∈Qj ,hvz,h∈Ii
ui(z)(pi
σ
i (ha, z)− piσi (h, z)) (19)
Therefore, robust sampling is same with external sampling when k = maxIi∈I |A(Ii)|.
• if k = 1 and σrs(k)i = σi, only one history z is sampled in this case,then urs(k)i (z) = ui(z)piσii (z) , ∃h ∈ Ii, for
a ∈ Ars(k)(Ii)
r˜σi ((a|Ii)|Qj) = r˜σi ((a|h)|Qj)
=
∑
z∈Qj ,havz
piσi (ha, z)u
rs
i (z)−
∑
z∈Qj ,hvz
piσi (h, z)u
rs
i (z)
=
(1− σi(a|h))ui(z)
piσi (ha)
(20)
For a 6∈ Ars(k)(Ii), the regret will be r˜σi ((a|h)|j) = 0− v˜σi (h|j). Therefore, robust sampling is same with
outcome sampling when k = 1 and σrs(k)i = σi.
• if k = 1, and player i randomly selects one action according to discrete uniform distribution unif(0, |A(Ii)|)
at information set Ii, then u
rs(1)
i (z) =
ui(z)
piσ
rs(k)
i (z)
is a constant, ∃h ∈ Ii, for a ∈ Ars(k)(Ii)
r˜σi ((a|Ii)|Qj) =
∑
z∈Qj ,havz,h∈Ii
piσi (ha, z)u
rs
i (z)−
∑
z∈Qj ,hvz,h∈Ii
piσi (h, z)u
rs
i (z)
= (1− σi(a|h))piσi (ha, z)urs(1)i (z)
(21)
if action a is not sampled at state h, the regret is r˜σi ((a|h)|j) = 0 − v˜σi (h|j). Compared to outcome
sampling, the robust sampling in that case have a lower variance because of the constant urs(1)i (z).
G.3 Mini-Batch MCCFR gives an unbiased estimation of counterfactual value
Lemma 5: EQj∼Robust Sampling[v˜σi (Ii|b)] = vσi (Ii).
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Proof:
EQj∼Robust Sampling[v˜σi (Ii|b)] = Eb′∼unif(0,b)[v˜σi (Ii|b′)]
= Eb′∼unif(0, b)
 b′∑
j=1
∑
h∈Ii,z∈Qj ,hvz
piσ−i(z)pi
σ
i (h, z)ui(z)
q(z)b′

= Eb′∼unif(0, b)
 1
b′
b′∑
j=1
v˜σi (Ii|Qj)

=
1
b
b∑
b′=1
 1
b′
b′∑
j=1
v˜σi (Ii|Qj)

=
1
b
b∑
b′=1
 1
b′
b′∑
j=1
E(v˜σi (Ii|Qj))

=
1
b
b∑
b′=1
 1
b′
b′∑
j=1
vσi (Ii)

= vσi (Ii)
(22)
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